The financial crisis made apparent the fact that managers and the boards of banks had failed to see the implications of irrational behavior and had ignored the risk associated with group think. Taking data from Switzerland our study shows that there is an increasing homogeneity of management and board teams. Most committees mainly consist of males with a managerial background. We derive from the existing literature the hypotheses that in radically changing
Introduction
The recent financial crisis raises the question why most directors in the bank and insurance industry did not have the foresight to predict the problems of taking on too much risk (Mundy, 11.10.2008) . We argue that a main reason for these failures is the increasing homogeneity of boards, e.g. the under-representation of varied educational backgrounds and differentiated viewpoints thereby leading to herding behavior and group think effects. We take Switzerland as an example because the Swiss economy is in large parts driven by the financial sector and some of the biggest Swiss Bank companies were affected by the financial crisis.
In the first section we show that in Switzerland homogeneity of boards and management teams is high within all business sectors; however we demonstrate that within the financial sector it is extraordinarily high. In the second section we argue in line with the literature in the field of psychological and behavioral economics that homogeneity increases group think; in particular homogeneous committees and groups often engage in herding behavior (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Chamley & Gale, 1994) and thus cause systematic risks. The illusion of invulnerability makes them incapable of forecasting the problems caused by their irrational behavior. In the banking industry, even when problems became apparent, few managers or directors of banks spoke up (Steverman & Bogoslaw, 11.10.2008) . They still believed in the rationality of their behavior and ignored the systematic risks caused by their herding behavior. In the third section we use a dataset which was collected shortly before the financial system was in danger of collapsing. We demonstrate that the group of individuals of both sexes with an education in management-related studies such as finance or economics as well as men regardless of their background, were significantly less capable of foreseeing the financial crisis than individuals with no management related background, and women regardless of their background. Unfortunately the latter two groups are highly underrepresented in most boards and management teams. In the last section we argue that more diverse management teams and boards would have been in a better position to estimate future unknowns than homogeneous groups, and therefore losses on mortgage-backed securities might have been lessened. This conclusion is in line with proposals which argue that board diversity is a valuable resource and increases creativity, innovation and encourages effective problem-solving (Adams & Flynn, 2005; Barnes et al., 2007; Carter et al., 2003; Erhardt et al., 2003) . It has been demonstrated that board diversity indeed increases firm profit (Carter et al., 2003; van der Walt et al., 2006) . We also discuss the disadvantages of diversity. Too much diversity increases conflicts of interests and slows down the decision making process. Nonetheless, in order to secure the wealth of a firm, diversity within the board and management team of most companies needs to be higher than its present level. To cope with the problem of group conflicts in diverse groups we introduce criss-cross theory as a way to mitigate these problems.
The Increasing Homogeneity of CEOs, Board Chairs and Boards
We start our research with a descriptive analysis of the education and gender of corporate leaders and monitors with the example of Switzerland. Our sample includes all companies listed in the Swiss Market Index (SMI) and a random sample of companies listed in the Swiss Performance Index (SPI), i.e. overall 151 companies quoted on the Swiss Exchange (SWX).
In order to study the variety in educational and gender composition of corporate leaders and monitors we split the sample into two industry groups: Corporations within the financial sector, including banks and insurance companies, and corporations within the non-financial sectors including manufacturing and the service industry. Further, we coded the gender and the educational backgrounds of CEOs, board chairs and directors. Educational backgrounds were classified according to three categories: (1) management-related background including final degrees in business, economics or law, (2) background in natural sciences including final degrees in engineering or physics, (3) backgrounds in other social sciences and humanities including degrees in psychology, political science, philosophy, sociology or arts. Only a few individuals had a multiple background and were assigned to each of these backgrounds. Data figure 4 illustrates the board composition according to gender. In total the percentage of women within both sectors is very low. However, within the financial sector women are represented more highly (8%) than within the non-financial sector (4%).
In summary, our descriptive analysis demonstrates that women and individuals with nonmanagement educations, i.e. backgrounds in natural sciences and humanities, are highly underrepresented in Swiss top-leader and board positions, in particular within the financial sector. 
Forecast Errors caused by Homogeneity and Group Think
Mainstream economic theory assumes that actors behave rationally: Actors are considered to be self-interested maximizer endowed to be unlimited information-processing and analytical faculties (Debreu & Scarf, 1963) . Although it has long been recognized that in reality many markets (Uzzi, 1997) -even stock markets (Baker, 1990 ) -depart radically from this theoretical model (Frey, 1999; Granovetter, 1985) , the assumption of rationality is the foundation of standard economic theory. Current applications of standard economic theory are the efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1970 (Fama, , 1991 and modern portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1952) .
This viewpoint stands in sharp contrast to the view of cognitive psychology: Individuals often act in a less than fully rational and self-serving manner . Psychological economics (for an overview see Frey & Benz, 2004) picks up this criticism by starting from the assumptions of bounded rationality (Simon, 1991) , of bounded willpower 1 (Elster, 1999; Jolls et al., 1998) , and of bounded self-interest 2 (Fehr et al., 2003a; Fehr et al., 2003b) .
We restrict our discussion to bounded rationality. In contrast to standard economics it is assumed that subjective risk factors influence decision making processes by shaping perceptions and reactions (McDonald & Stehle, 1975) . First, behavior is affected by representativeness: In order to render complex problems manageable humans have an inclination to predict uncertain events in the future by taking a small portion of data and drawing a holistic conclusion (Kahneman & Lovallo, 1990; .
Second, behavior is affected by mimicry, e.g. many people discover 'trends' in past prices and expect their continuation (De Long et al., 1990) . Third, behavior is affected by anchoring and adjustment: Persons often use a past event or a trend as a reference point for upcoming decisions (Ricciardi & Simon, 2001; .
These insights correspond with research on group think. Some groups under certain conditions produce homogenous beliefs and behavior due to conformity processes. At the same time individuals are often excluded from these groups whose characteristics do not conform to the characteristics of the majority. We discuss the group think phenomenon and its underlying conditions to develop our hypotheses.
Forecast Errors and Group Think
The theory of group think was proposed by Janis (1972; 1982) . He "hypothesizes that decision making groups are most likely to experience groupthink when they are highly cohesive, insulated from experts, perform limited search and appraisal of information, operate under directed leadership, and experience conditions of high stress with low self-esteem and little hope of finding a better solution to a pressing problem than that favored by the leader or 2 i.e. people care about being treated fairly and want to treat others fairly if those others are themselves behaving fairly.
influential members" (Turner & Pratkanis, 1998: 105) . These conditions are assumed to lead to two symptoms of groupthink (Katz & Kahn, 1966) . The first symptom includes the illusion of invulnerability, stereotyping of out-groups, self-censorship and the belief in the inherent morality of the group (Leahy, 1992) . The second symptom involves the incomplete survey of alternatives and objectives, poor information searching, failure to appraise the risks of the preferred solution and selective information processing (Turner & Pratkanis, 1998 Thus, adaptation processes proceed in the direction of the actors with higher capabilities (Rost, 2008; Skinner, 1953) . The third argument thus explains why experts or specialists promote group think.
Psychological literature explains under which circumstances group think results in forecast errors and poor decision making. It is postulated that uncertainty is a crucial point . Uncertainty often occurs in situations in which the environment radically changes. Such changes often destroy the usefulness of established knowledge (Henderson & Clark, 1990; Tushman & Anderson, 1986) . Groups which are infected by group think, i.e.
which rely on homogenous opinions dominated by expert knowledge, under such circumstances often come to wrong decisions. They systematically underestimate alternative explanations by failing to re-evaluate the new situation (Katz & Allen, 1982) .
In summary, psychological literature explains why homogenous groups are characterized by group think and poor decisions: These groups produce homogenous beliefs and behavior through conformity processes which include the exclusion of individuals with underrepresented characteristics, the adapting of opinions and the over reliance on experts.
Under uncertainty, i.e. in a situation where the environment is radically changing, group think promotes poor decisions.
Education as a driver of forecast errors
Psychological literature supports the view that especially experts often fall victim to an oversight trap (Arkes et al., 1986; Fox & Clemen, 2005; Griffin & Tversky, 1992; Paese & Feuer, 1991; Spense, 1996) . It has been shown that experts often overestimate the precision of their information and draw wrong conclusions with regard to estimating the probabilities of random outcomes, e.g., clinical psychologists (Oskamp, 1965) , physicians and nurses (Baumann et al., 1991; Christensen-Szalanski & Bushyhead, 1981) , engineers (Kidd, 1970) , entrepreneurs (Cooper et al., 1988; Hayward et al., 2006) , investment bankers (von Holstein, 1972) , stock market forecasters (Deaves et al., 2005) , or security analysts (Bar-Yosef & Venezia, 2006) .
Cognitive biases also affect business decisions to a large extent (Bruner, 2005; Lovallo & Kahneman, 2003; Lovallo & Sibony, 2006; Powell et al., 2006; Zajac & Bazerman, 1991) . It has been shown that biased executives exhibit high investment-cash flow sensitivity (Malmendier & Tate, 2005) , engage intensively in unsuccessful mergers and acquisitions (Lovallo et al., 2007; Malmendier & Tate, forthcoming; Roll, 1986) , are convinced about finding hidden synergies and about selecting the best targets for their company (Doukas & Petzemas, 2007) , show a willingness to overpay for acquisitions (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997) , avoid tapping the capital markets (Malmendier, Tate, and Yan 2006) , execute stock options only shortly before they expire (Malmendier & Tate, 2003) , think that the total profit earned by all other business entrants will be negative, but their own profit will be positive (Camerer & Lovallo, 1999) , or that CEOs who feel "above average" are more likely to manage earnings to meet these forecasts (Hribar & Yang, 2006) .
Empirical evidence further indicates that there is a pronounced "CFO effect" in corporate decisions (Bertrand & Schoar, 2003) . CFOs are experts concerning capital structure, payout, and capital allocation decisions (Graham & Harvey, 2001) . The research of Ben-David et al.
( 2007) demonstrates that overconfidence and optimism are persistent characteristics of CFOs:
they are more confident following periods of high market return and less confident following low market returns periods. This finding is consistent with the significant amount of literature in the field of behavioral finance (Barberis & Thaler, 2002; Ricciardi, 2004; Ricciardi & Simon, 2000) which shows that especially financial experts put too much emphasis on the latest, most striking news and too little on base-rate information (Daniel et al., 2001) . BenDavid et al. (2007) demonstrate that the cognitive biases of CFOs have far-reaching and negative consequences for shareholders: Firms with overconfident CFOs invest more and engage in more acquisition, are less likely to pay dividends, instead using the funds to make investments, have higher debt ratios, and rely more heavily on long-term debt.
This literature explains the cognitive biases of experts by referring to special information and past experiences which distinguish experts from novices and less experienced people (Litterer, 1965) . Experts have an intense experience through education and practice in a particular field. Their familiarity in a particular field of study enables them to rapidly retrieve complex configurations of information from long-term memory (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 2005) .
For example, investors utilize familiarity heuristics when they have to assess difficult financial circumstances and investment choices within a narrow timeframe (Ricciardi & Simon, 2001 ). However, familiarity can be inappropriate when situations are characterized by modified and non-typical circumstances. Experts in a non-typical situation often reason that prior knowledge can be correctly applied to the new situation .
The literature presents four reasons for the tendency of experts to over-or underestimate the probability of non-typical events, and to therefore come to wrong forecasts and decisions.
First, experts focus too much on the circumstances underlying "typical" events and too little on the circumstances underlying a specific event. This human tendency is referred to as availability, status quo or representativeness bias (Fox, 2006; . It suggests that the likelihood of events is estimated based on how many examples of such events come to mind (Fox & Tversky, 1995) . Individuals who are subject to this bias prefer the current state, ignore relevant facts that should be included in the decision-making process and thus predict uncertain future events by taking a small portion of data and drawing a holistic conclusion (Fox & Hadar, 2006; Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988) .
Second, experts may be overconfident in existing scientific knowledge and thus ignore how certain factors perform together as a whole (Slovic et al., 1985) . Overconfidence means that humans have an inclination to overestimate their own skills, abilities, and predictions for success (Ricciardi & Simon, 2001 ).
Third, experts may be more prone to anchoring. Anchoring explains the strong inclination to latch on to a belief, that may or may not be truthful, and to use it as a reference point for upcoming decisions (Hammond et al., 1998) . One of the most frequent anchors is a past event or trend. Compared with less experienced people experts have more knowledge about past events or trends and thus may also have a higher probability by selecting trends as an initial reference point.
Fourth, experts may have a higher illusion of control (Langer, 1975) . It makes a person believe that he or she can control the outcome of a random decision or situation based on their skills (Baker & Nofsinger, 2002) . Experts may assume that they have a greater ability to foresee and navigate potential hazards and therefore may systematically underestimate risks (Powell et al., 2006) .
There is much evidence suggesting that the familiarity bias under uncertainty operates in capital market decisions as well. 3 Relying on the literature we hypothesize the following:
Stock market forecasts of financial experts were less valid compared with the forecast of nonfinancial experts when the situation was different from the time before. This was the case when rapidly increasing housing prices heralded a bubble. Under financial experts we understand individuals with financial education, financial experience or with beliefs which go along with financial backgrounds.
Hypothesis 1. Stock market forecasts of financial experts were systematically less valid compared with the stock market forecasts of non-financial experts in the situation when harbingers of the financial crisis were obvious.
Gender as a driver of forecast errors
There is a great deal of literature which shows that women and men react differently emotionally and that these reactions influence the judgment process and decision making.
This literature points out that females reveal a greater level of worry than man (for an extensive overview see: Ricciardi, 2008) . For example it has been shown that women have a more negative problem orientation then men (Robichaud et al., 2003) and have more unfocused worries which are not necessarily connected to recent stressful events. They tend "to worry about a wide range of subject matter such as their personal and professional relationships, finances, money, economic conditions, work experiences, retirement issues, family problems, educational topics, sexual relations, safety concerns, and health issues" (Ricciardi, 2008: 20) . The causes of these gender differences in worrying are unclear. They might be the results of different socialization processes but could be as well inborn.
professionally close or that he has held for a long period (Massa & Simonov, 2006) . Portfolio managers have more pessimistic expectations about foreign stocks than about domestic stocks (Strong & Xu, 2003) . In international financial markets, investors tend to hold domestic assets instead of diversifying across countries (French & Poterba, 1991) . Firms tend to cross list their stocks in countries where investors are more familiar with the firms to be listed (Pagano et al., 2002) . Lower levels of trust toward citizens of a country lead to less trade with that country, less portfolio allocation to assets in that country, and less direct investment in that country (Guiso et al., 2007) .
From a psychological perspective "worrying is often seen as a constructive occupation that helps to solve potential problems" (Davey, 1994: 35) . Many researchers have noted that uncertainty represents an important variable in our understanding of worry (e.g. Dugas et al., 1997; Dugas et al., 2001) . At a general level, individuals who worry show a higher intolerance of uncertainty (MacLeod et al., 1991) . Intolerance of uncertainty may be defined as the excessive tendency of an individual to consider it unacceptable that a negative event may occur, however small the probability of its occurrence.
Since there is strong evidence for a relation between worry and intolerance of uncertainty most financial literature discusses the negative effects of worrying on risk taking and performance. For example it has been demonstrated that people who are incapable of feeling emotions as a result of brain lesions accept more risk with high rewards (Shiv et al., 2005) or that students who worry about money perform less well then their peers in degree examinations (Ross et al., 2006) . The findings, (a) that women have a higher tendency to worry and (b) that worrying reduces financial risk taking and performance might partially explain why women are highly underrepresented within management teams and boards. This However, as indicated by the relationship between worrying and uncertainty, in some situations worrying might be helpful, for example by forecasting unlikely negative outcomes.
For example, it has been shown that managers in the presence of affective reactions tend to reject investment alternatives that elicited a negative effect (Moreno et al., 2002) . For this reason we hypothesize that at times where harbingers of the financial crisis such as the rapidly increasing housing bubble were obvious, i.e. when the situation was different from the time before, the stock market forecasts of women were more valid compared with the forecast of men. The more negative problem orientation might help women by reflecting on multiple past circumstances and thus by forecasting unlikely negative events.
Hypothesis 2. Stock market forecasts of women were systematically more valid compared with the stock market forecasts of men in the situation when harbingers of the financial crisis were obvious.
Method Sample
We conducted a survey within the time where harbingers of the financial crisis were already obvious, but the extent of the financial crisis was unknown. The survey was conducted from SFR. The UBS case was also the most prominent in the Swiss public media, e.g. in newspapers, TV, radio, talk-shows etc. Thus, even people with no financial interests or no expertise had a great deal of information about the UBS case. Second, after the announcement of considerable losses in the quarterly report, the UBS stock price recovered and started to increase again, i.e. in the month before we conducted our study the share prices increased from 27 SFR up to 33 SFR. The situation for market forecasts was non-typical, i.e. it was characterized through highly volatile stock prices and a high amount of uncertainty. In the time period when the survey was conducted a recurrence of fall in prices was contraintuitive for most people. As we will demonstrate later only 21% of the participants expected such a development. 54% of the participants put emphasis on the latest, most striking news, e.g. the recovery of the UBS share price in context with the belief that the financial situation would recover soon and all sub-prime write-offs were included in the UBS quarterly report.
Figure 5 about here
In order to reach a high number of students with diverse educational backgrounds we used a combination of two sampling methods, snowball sampling and stratified sampling. 42
students from different fields of study, e.g. psychologists, students in finance, management, and economics were asked to interview 10-20 students from the University of Zurich as well as from the neighboring ETH. In order to ensure a sufficient number of students with financial experience it was required that at least 20% of the interviewed students had practical experience in the stock market. Our final sample is in a number of areas (e.g. the number of passed semesters, age, grad point average) a true representative sample for the whole University of Zurich and the ETH. In other areas, e.g. the overrepresentation of persons with stock market experience (35%), the overrepresentation of men (66%), of students with management-related background (70%) and in particular of finance students (20%), the sample intentionally does not reflect a normal student sample.
Variables
Accuracy of forecasting prediction. The accuracy of forecasting predictions was measured by asking the respondents within the time period 3.04.-8.04.2008 about the development of the UBS stock price within the next two months (5-point-Scale: 1= UBS stock price will rise massively to 5= UBS stock price will fall massively). In order to minimize random predictions of irresolute respondents every person also had the possibility to answer "no idea". The distribution of the answers is shown in figure 6 . Higher values indicate more accurate forecasts because in reality the UBS stock price declined within the forecasting period.
Figure 6 about here
The next measurements try to capture the independent variable, i.e. financial expertise. We applied different measurements which can be categorized as educational, knowledge, experience, information gathering, beliefs and socialization variables.
Education (Field of study).
The participants were asked about their main field of study. 30%
of all participants have a non-management-related background, i.e. they have a background in natural sciences (15%) or in humanities/social sciences (15%). The remaining 70% have a management-related background. In the following we contrast these students against students with non-management-related backgrounds. Students with management-related background were classified into four different fields of management education: (1) finance (0= no, 1= yes), (2) economics (0= no, 1= yes), (3) management (0= no, 1= yes), and (4) management and economics, i.e. an all-rounder education in economics and management (0= no, 1= yes).
Knowledge. Knowledge about financial issues and stock markets was measured by three items. On a general level the respondents were asked on a 5-point scale how they evaluate their knowledge of stock markets (1= uninformed, 5= expert). Furthermore, we asked if the students have ever attended lectures about stock markets or financial issues (0= no, 1= yes) and if the students dabble in stocks and shares (0= no, 1= yes). As a consequence of our sampling method the students who are active on stock markets with their own money, is overrepresented with 35%.
Experience. Experiences within the real financial sector were measured by two items. Most
Swiss students are employed part time outside of their university studies. We asked if the students are employed within the financial sector (0= no, 1= yes). In fact, 20% have a job within the financial sector. Furthermore, incentive pay, i.e. bonus pay or variable pay through shares and stock options, is most common within the financial sector. We asked if the students are paid via incentive pay within their jobs (0= no, 1= yes). 19% of the respondents answered yes.
Information. The amount of knowledge is influenced by the kind of information gathering.
We asked the participants which newspaper sections they read regularly. We differentiated between regular information about "economy" and/or "finance" (0= no, 1= yes), about "national politics" and/or "international politics" (0= no, 1= yes), and about "society" including sports, culture, and/or gossip (0= no, 1= yes).
Beliefs. Beliefs are influenced by the kind of education and the kind of knowledge. Economic or financial experts often believe in standard economic theory, e.g. in the invisible hand of markets. In order to capture these beliefs we asked the respondents to agree on five items by using a 5-point scale (1= totally disagree to 5= totally agree). These items were: (1) Beliefs might be reflected in professional career wishes aswell. We asked the respondents where they see themselves within the next 10 years, i.e. as a normal employee, as a manager, as a top-manager, as an entrepreneur, or as a full-time mother/father. From these answers we selected two: career as a top-manager (0= no, 1= yes) and career as an entrepreneur (0= no, 1= yes). The assumption is that persons who wish to become a top-manager or entrepreneur have a higher expert status within social systems going along with typical expert beliefs.
Socialization. Socialization might have consequences on forecasting predictions because it
influences learning processes, beliefs or self-selecting in a field of study. We captured socialization by the following items: (1) One parent is working in the finance sector (0= no, 
Risk orientation. Financial literature often discusses an individual's risk perception or risk
orientation as an important driver of judgment process and decision making (Ricciardi, 2004) .
Therefore, we additionally included an individual's risk orientation. We measured risk orientation using two alternative measurements.
First, we asked how much money a person would reinvest in stocks if he/she has bought stocks for CHF 1000 and sold these stocks for CHF 2000. Individuals who would reinvest more then CHF 1000 were coded as "1" indicating a higher risk orientation. Persons who reinvest less or equal then CHF 1000 were coded as "0" indicating a lower risk orientation.
We call this variable "Willingness to take financial risks".
Second, we measured the general risk orientation of persons by using a multiple item scale (1= totally disagree to 5= totally agree). The 14 items are listed in 
Analyses
We examine the effects of the independent variables on the accuracy of forecast predictions by running simple OLS regression analyses, i.e. we assume that our dependent variable has a quasi-metric scale. We ran sensitivity tests by comparing these results with the results of logit regression analyses using "wrong" and "right" forecasts as our dependent variable and with the results of ordinal regression analyses. The results do not significantly differ. Furthermore, we ran sensitivity tests by comparing the OLS results with the results of clustered regression analyses. We clustered according to the 42 students who interviewed the 479 students. The snowball sampling method does not significantly bias our results. For simplicity we will mainly document the results of OLS regression analyses. In the final model we will show the results of sensitivity tests.
Our regression models build on a sample of 355 students. 64 students of the 479 students had to been excluded because we have no usable information on the dependent variable "UBS stock price forecasts". Other persons had to been excluded because we have incomplete information on some independent variables. Furthermore, since expert knowledge is measured using different kinds of indicators, some of these indicators are highly correlated with each other. In order to avoid problems caused by multicollinearity, we will run separate models for different indicator types. In all partial models we check for demographic characteristics.
Finally, we will run a model which includes all variables. As these results could be distorted by multicollinearity we will also test if the identified significant variables are still significant in a model which only includes these drivers. These final results are then tested for sensitivity by running a clustered regression and an ordinal regression aswell. Table 4 documents the results of the regression analyses. We first discuss the effect of gender on forecasting predictions; we next turn to the effects of financial expert knowledge on forecasting predictions, and finally discuss the results of the overall model and the sensitivity tests. Expert knowledge. Model I tests whether the field of study has effects on the accuracy of forecast predictions in uncertain situations. It turns out that finance and economic students were more frequently wrong to a significant extent in their forecast predictions compared with students who have no finance or economic background, supporting Hypothesis 1. A descriptive analysis shows that 15% of all finance students and 16% of all students of economics made accurate forecast predictions. The percentage for non-finance students totals 23% and that for non-economic students 22%.
Results
Model II tests whether knowledge about the stock exchange and finance knowledge influences forecasts. We obtained two significant effects supporting hypothesis 1: students who visited courses about stock markets and finance and students who are active on the stock exchange made less accurate forecasts compared with students who didn't have this
knowledge. Descriptive analyses demonstrate that the accurate forecasts of students without knowledge were nearly twice as high.
Model III tests whether experience, i.e. employment in the finance sector or incentive pay, influences forecast predictions. Both variables show negative but nonetheless insignificant effects.
Model IV tests the effects of information gathering on forecast predictions. It turns out that regular information about economy & finance and about politics has no effects while regular information about society increases the likelihood that individuals made more accurate forecasts. Thus, the data indirectly supports hypothesis 1 by showing that "non-expert" information, i.e. information which is not connected to financial issues, increased the accuracy of forecasts.
Model V tests whether beliefs influence forecasts. In line with hypothesis 1 it turns out that people who highly trust in self-regulating, efficient markets made significant less accurate forecasts. Career wishes as a top-manager or as an entrepreneur show negative but again insignificant effects on the accuracy of forecasts.
Model VI and model VII test whether socialization or risk orientation influence forecasting predictions. No variable shows significant effects. The non-findings of model VII are especially surprising because finance and standard economic literature pay much attention to risk orientation and one could expect high effects on forecasting predictions. In our sample however that is not the case.
Overall model and sensitivity tests. Model VIII in table 2 illustrates the results of an overall model. It mainly supports the results of the partial models. Males, students who visited courses about stock markets and finance, and who highly trust in self-regulating, efficient markets made significantly less accurate forecasts supporting hypothesis 1 and 2.
Finally, the models in table 5 test if the results are stable by including only the significant variables of the overall model, i.e. gender, finance courses and trust in optimal contracts. The results support the former findings indicating that multicollinearity has not biased the results.
Furthermore, the OLS regression model, the clustered regression model, and the ordinal regression model show related findings indicating that the results are not sensitive to the kind of method applied. Gender, finance courses and trust in optimal contracts explain the accuracy of forecast predictions between 23% and 28%, which is an acceptable proportion of explained variance for a social explanation. These persons made only 10% accurate forecasts whereas the forecast accuracy of persons who share only one or none of these characteristics varies between 26% and 35%.
Second, in uncertain situations the forecast accuracy of women seems to be less affected by beliefs and expert knowledge. Women who have strong beliefs in mainstream expert knowledge or have access to expert knowledge made just as good predictions as men who have weak beliefs in mainstream expert knowledge or have no access to expert knowledge.
Respectively 23% and 27% of these women and men made accurate forecasts.
Third, the last results can be extended: Women who have weak beliefs in mainstream expert knowledge or have no access to expert knowledge made by far the best predictions.
Respectively 39% and 42% of these women made accurate forecasts. In contrast, men who have strong beliefs in mainstream expert knowledge or have access to expert knowledge made by far the worst predictions. Respectively only 12% and 13 % of these men made accurate forecasts.
In summary, the results support our hypotheses by showing that knowledge and gender affects the accuracy of forecasting predictions. Within the situation where harbingers of the financial crisis were already obvious our data show that the stock market forecasts of women and of non-experts were systematically more accurate. These results are strongly supported by the findings that women who are non-experts made by far the best forecasts whereas men who are experts made by far the worst forecasts. Our results also show some interesting details about the interaction between expertise and gender: First, under uncertainty the market predictions of women are not to the same extent affected by expert knowledge and beliefs as the forecasts of men. Women with financial expertise or beliefs are mistaken as frequently as are men without this expertise or beliefs. Second, in times of uncertainty expert knowledge is a major driver of wrong forecasts if individuals simultaneously strongly believe in the status quo of mainstream models in the discipline. 
Discussion and Implications
Our paper started with the question why managers of banks and their boards had failed to see the problems of irrational behavior within the last years and ignored the systematic risks of group think. Most managers and boards constantly increased the financial leverage of their banks, which not only increased the vulnerability of their bank to the mortgage-backed securities losses but also of the whole financial system. We answered the question by the increasing homogeneity of these committees, especially within the financial sector: In the last few years people with non-management backgrounds and women were highly underrepresented in most positions. In our theoretical section we demonstrated how homogeneity fosters group think and systematic risks. We hypothesized that in radically changing environments underrepresented groups, i.e. non-experts and women, make far better market forecasts. These expectations were strongly supported by our data. As a consequence, it might be the case that the financial crisis could have been lessened if the leaders and boards in banks had been more diverse.
Management team and board diversity has been a controversial topic for many years. On the one hand some authors argue that diversity promotes a better understanding of the market place, increases creativity, innovation, and effective problem-solving (Adams & Flynn, 2005; Barnes et al., 2007; Carter et al., 2003; Erhardt et al., 2003) . In line with such arguments it has been demonstrated by some authors that board diversity does indeed increase firm profit (Carter et al., 2003; van der Walt et al., 2006) . On the other hand some authors argue that diverse boards and management teams are less capable of engaging in debates and are therefore less effective (Sheridan & Milgate, 2005; van der Walt & Ingley, 2003; Yermack, 1996) . In line with these arguments it has been shown by other authors that there is mixed evidence regarding the effect of team composition on corporate performance (de Andres et al., 2005; Dulewicz & Herbert, 2004) . Both findings are in line with the literature on diversity which shows that diversity has an inverse u-relationship on performance, i.e. the diversity in teams should be neither to low nor to high (Perry-Smith & Shalley, 2003; Stock, 2005) .
However, the suggestion that board diversity should lie somewhere in-between is difficult to implement. As shown in the theory sections, teams with overrepresented groups tend to become homogenous in progress with time because the majority continuously excludes minorities.
Criss-cross theory might help companies to achieve an optimal degree of board and management team diversity. The term criss-crossing characterizes situations in which exist contradictory indicators of group identity (Eiser, 1986) , i.e. the same person can be related to one group based on one aspect, i.e. to be a male, and to another one based on a different aspect, i.e. to be a non-expert (Flap, 1988) . Criss-cross theory thus requires at least two characteristics which allow a classification of group members in majority and minority. Our paper discusses the effects of two characteristics, i.e. of gender and expert knowledge, which permit this kind of group member classification. In such groups four status constellations are possible by subdividing actors into each two subgroups: (1) Males who are experts, (2) females who are non-experts, (3) males who are non-experts, (4) females who are experts. If the majority and the minority are demarcated by visible group borders, e.g. if the majority consists of males who are experts and the minority consists of women who are non-experts, the potential for conflicts is high. In contrast, the potential for conflict is low, if some persons do not have a clear group affiliation and therefore belong partially to both groups, e.g. males who are non-experts or females who are experts. Such criss-cross individuals serve as a bridge between the otherwise separate groups. i.e. the minority and the majority. They not only confound group borders between conflicting parties but also prevent the self-reinforcing homogeneity in groups which are characterized by majorities (Flap, 1988) .
In summary, companies can rely on simple social mechanisms in order to reach an optimal degree of team diversity. Firms should increase the diversity of their boards and management teams by simultaneous including more persons with non-management backgrounds and more women. They should take into consideration that some individuals should serve as a bridge between the otherwise unconnected groups, i.e. they should not only include females with non-management background but also males with non-management background or females with a management background. Criss-crossing permits majorities within groups, e.g. of persons with management backgrounds, without fostering conflicts or the exclusion of minorities.
Limitations and Further Research
Three limitations of our research need to be addressed. First, our empirical analysis is based on a student sample and therefore external validity is doubtful (Harrison & List, 2004 
Conclusion
The main contribution of this study consists in its findings that under uncertainty forecasts of women and people of both sexes with non-managerial backgrounds are by far better than the forecasts of men and persons with management-related backgrounds. The increasing homogeneity of boards and management teams in stock corporations, especially within the financial sector, might therefore be detrimental for the governance of firms. We argue that firms can use simple social mechanisms in order to increase the diversity of their managers and directors while not increasing the danger of time consuming conflicts. To mitigate corporate governance failures firms should include in their boards and management teams criss-cross individuals, i.e. persons who have no clear-cut group affiliation such as males with a non-management background and women with a management background. Legend: Dependent variable accuracy of forecasting prediction of the change in the UBS stock price in the next 2 months. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.01. Legend: Dependent variable accuracy of forecasting prediction of the change in the UBS stock price in the next 2 months. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.01.
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